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Abstract: The insider threat has consistently been identified as a key threat to organizations and 
governments. Understanding the nature of insider threats and the related threat landscape can help 
in forming mitigation strategies, including non-technical means. In this paper, we survey and 
highlight challenges associated with the identification and detection of insider threats in both public 
and private sector organizations, especially those part of a nation’s critical infrastructure. We 
explore the utility of the cyber kill chain to understand insider threats, as well as understanding the 
underpinning human behavior and psychological factors. The existing defense techniques are 
discussed and critically analyzed, and improvements are suggested, in line with the current state-
of-the-art cyber security requirements. Finally, open problems related to the insider threat are 
identified and future research directions are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The threats that insiders pose to government organizations, businesses, and institutions continue 
to be a critical concern. Current research provides unambiguous evidence that emphasizes the 
severity and prevalence of this threat in businesses today [1], [2]. According to a 2020 global report 
[3], the average global cost of insider threats rose by 31% in the last two years to $11.45 million, and 
the occurrence of incidents spiked by 47% in that period. Through the assessment and analysis of 
incidents, the challenge of insider threat (IT) can be better understood and addressed. For example, 
the Threat Landscape Report 2016 [4] by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) 
classified the top four insider incidents/actions as follows: privilege abuse (60%), data mishandling 
(13%), use of non-approved hardware (10%), and abuse of privilege possession (10%). As per the 
Threat Landscape Report 2018 [5] by the ENISA, 27% of data breach incidents were caused by human 
factors or negligence and according to a study, phishing (67%) is the major issue in the case of 
unintentional insider threats. Weak or reused passwords (56%), unlocked devices (44%), password 
sharing practice (44%), and unsecured Wi-Fi networks (32%) were also part of the list of unintentional 
insider threats. Moreover, the report identifies that the prevalence of these attacks has increased to 
56%, whilst 30% of organizations believe that they have experienced one too many attacks. Therefore, 
this enunciates the crucial need for preliminary defensive actions to be executed by organizations to 
combat this threat. 
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Typically, businesses invest in security defenses to strengthen their network against outside 
malicious attacks. However, they fail to deploy protection against potential threats by malicious or 
compromised insiders. Insiders can abuse their authorized access to critical systems and eventually 
steal or modify data systems for malicious intent or financial gain [1]. Insider threat targets not only 
private sector enterprises, but also government institutions and critical infrastructures for motives, 
ranging from monetary gains and industrial espionage to business advantage and sabotage [2]. 
Because insiders have access to valuable information assets that are unavailable to outsiders, 
damages resulting from insider attacks can be devastating. Furthermore, these threats are increasing 
in scale, scope, and sophistication; thus, emphasizing the critical need for organizations to apply 
current security techniques. 
According to the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) [6], an insider is 
someone who exploits or has the intention to exploit their legitimate access to an organization’s assets 
for unauthorized purposes. Furthermore, credentials are provided to trusted employees, such as 
username and passwords, therefore offering a gateway to an organization’s information network, 
meaning concealment within the infrastructure is effortless [7]. This threat is sophisticated enough to 
compromise the security principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability that must be 
guaranteed for any secure defense system [8]. As per a recent survey, 27% of the total cyber crime 
incidents were supposed to be conducted by insiders, and 30% of respondents specified that the 
destruction caused by insiders was more severe than the loss caused by external attackers [9]. 
1.1. Context and Scope 
ENISA [4] has demonstrated the dangers of the insider threat for the security of organizations, 
epitomizing the critical need to address them. The present work aims to extend the knowledge of 
how insider threat is expanding and to detail the comprehensive actions required by organizations 
to address the critical risks it poses. This is imperative as organizations are constantly directing 
funding into traditional strategies that are unable to protect against the insider threat. This paper 
introduces how the technologies/tools used by insiders can expand through all seven stages of the 
kill chain that are recognized in many cyber-attacks. From the tools that insiders use, the present 
work proposes a layered defense approach involving policies, organizational culture, and technical 
environment to combat the threat. 
1.2. Our Contribution 
To protect critical assets, organizations must recognize the nuances and breadth of this threat. 
This paper endeavors to provide an informed evaluation of the insider threat that is perpetual and 
destructive for organizations everywhere. The technologies and practices insiders use are identified 
with explained relevance to the cyber kill chain. The practices that organizations should use for 
defending against insider threats are highlighted with common best practices and recommendations 
to assist in combating the threat. Concluding, a critical evaluation of the respective threat is presented, 
from understanding the nature of the threat to the best security defenses with the current state of the 
art research. 
A survey in [10] presents data of 105 enterprise users that reveal the insider threat emerging 
from trusted employees and inconsistent practices. However, the work does not highlight any 
detection or remedial methods to combat insider threats. Further, a survey study in [11] considered 
only the three most common types of insider threats: traitor, masquerader, and unintentional 
perpetrator, and discussed their countermeasures from a data analytics perspective. The work [12] 
presents a detailed survey on insider threats that decently summarizes the structural taxonomy of 
insider threat incidents. Their approach, however, focused on the relevant dataset and the other 
aspects of the insider incidents and their countermeasures. Open issues and future directions are only 
partially discussed. The work [13] conducted a systematic review of 37 articles from the period 1950–
2015. It analyzed best-to-date insider threat detection and prediction algorithms and then ranked 
them, but excluded theoretical papers. Our study presents a novel aspect of the insider threats as to 
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their significance to the cyber kill chain. Hence, our work compliments the existing survey works on 
the insider threat. Now, we summarize our three-fold contribution as follows: 
1. As a novel contribution to the literature, we identified the relevance of insider threat to the cyber 
kill chain and its propagation through different phases. 
2. We evaluated the current state of the art (threat landscape) in terms of understanding the nature 
of insider threat, assessing associated risks, highlighting the effectiveness of techniques in 
detecting and mitigating risks, and propose enhancements for mitigating the impact of such 
threats. 
3. We highlighted open problems and future directions for addressing insider threats in different 
forms targeting several subsystems of the organization. 
1.3. Paper Organization 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an understanding of the nature 
of the insider threat, including different goals and types of insiders. Section 3 discusses the potential 
attack vectors (e.g., technologies, tools, and practices). Section 4 uses the cyber kill chain to 
understand an insider attacker. Sections 5 discusses various mitigation strategies and their 
evaluation, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work and highlights future directions. 
2. Understanding the Nature of Insider Threats 
The nature of insider threat needs to be explored to enhance the understanding of insider threat. 
Therefore, the many different types of insider threats need to be distinguished. Definitions vary from 
the misuse of privilege abuse to broader definitions involving the effect on the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of corporate data [14]. The substance of these definitions depicts trusted 
personnel abusing their privileges for specific purposes to cause detrimental effects to a corporation. 
2.1. Types of Insiders 
Abnormal activities could be an indication of the inside threat. A few examples could be an 
activity at unusual times (e.g., logging into the system late at night), a large volume of data traffic 
(e.g., transmitting too much data over the network), and unusual or not routine activity (e.g., 
accessing unusual machine or database). Generally, these activities are resulted in when the 
employees appear not to be satisfied with the system or employer. Here, we consider mainly three 
types of insiders: malicious insider, compromised insider, and careless insider. 
Malicious insider: An insider who intentionally abuses legitimate credentials maliciously to 
steal information for financial or personal gains [15]. For example, an individual who dislikes the 
employer can sell secret information to an outsider. They could be a great benefit to the competitors 
as these insiders generally do have sufficient knowledge about the security policies and practices as 
well as the vulnerabilities of the organization. 
Compromised insider: An insider whose account credential has been harvested and 
unintentionally enables an attacker to access sensitive information or resources [16]. For example, an 
attacker can target a compromised insider by harvesting his login credentials through social 
engineering and then accesses confidential assets, which can result in the theft of an organization’s 
intellectual property (IP) or other personably identifiable information (PII). Social engineering is a 
technique representing malicious activities that are targeted through human interactions to either 
inject a malware or retrieve sensitive information. It applies psychological manipulation to trap users 
making security mistakes or overlook associated risks. Detecting such an attack is quite difficult, as 
the attacker uses the legitimate credentials of an authorized user, which will generally not trigger any 
security alerts. 
Careless insider: This category of the insiders includes people who make the most common 
mistakes and generally do not pay significant attention to the security practices of the organization. 
An insider under this category unintentionally and unknowingly exposes the key resources to the 
outsiders. For example, a receptionist employee who does not realize the security threat to the system 
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can click on the insecure links, which may enable outsiders to get access to the system or key 
resources. 
For the first two types, typically the attacker carries out attacks differently, whereas, for the third 
one, there will not be any deliberate attacks. 
2.2. Goals for Insider Attacks 
Typically, the objectives of insider fraud can range from theft of information assets and direct 
theft of the corporation’s funds to trading data for personal gain [17]. Four types of insider threats 
have been established through the motive and purpose of an attack: fraud, sabotage of infrastructure, 
theft of IP, and unintentional insider threat (UIT) [18]. 
Insider fraud: This has been regarded as one of the most common forms of attack, with 61% of 
companies rating it extremely prevalent within their corporation [17]. Most of the time, the intention 
of the insider leading a fraud is financial gain. This emphasizes the clear need for organizations to 
develop mitigation measures to protect assets as financial gain is an influence in these attacks. 
Insider threat sabotage: It is committed typically by insiders with technical positions and highly 
sophisticated skills. They involve privilege escalation techniques and the implementation of malware 
such as advanced persistent threats (APTs) to disrupt information systems. The motives behind these 
attacks are harming the organization’s data or a specific individual due to disgruntlement, unmet 
expectations, or stress [19]. 
IP Theft: IP theft involves stealing crucial data, including source code or customer information. 
Attackers use technical strategies like phishing emails or network transfers who have legitimate 
access. Kaspersky [10] found that 75% of the data that were stolen from organizations, the user had 
authorized access to. However, there are still high statistics that insiders with no legitimate access 
using the same techniques are still damaging the organization’s assets. 
Unintentional Insider: The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)’s insider threat 
team (a part of the Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute) uses the following 
working definition of UIT [20]: 
“An unintentional insider threat is (1) a current or former employee, contractor, or business 
partner (2) who has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data and who, 
(3) through action or inaction without malicious intent, (4) unwittingly causes harm or substantially 
increases the probability of future serious harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
organization’s resources or assets, including information, information systems, or financial systems”. 
The rise in UIT activity has risen, which arises due to individual neglect or carelessness, such as 
opening a phishing email or losing storage devices [21]. These are just as important to organizations 
as they are occurring more significantly than intended malicious activity [22]. They generally do not 
have any malicious intent to harm the organization. However, any harm causing may lead to 
sensitive information leakage and/or unauthorized access to outsiders. 
There is another factor, “workplace violence”, that can influence the working behavior of the 
employees. This is evident in the practice of physical attacks, threatening or inappropriate behavior 
and speech (written or verbal), harassment, resource damage, or other actions that could place fellow 
employees at risk. According to a Federal Bureau of Investigation report [23] on behaviors of active 
shooters, 62% of the people who went on to become shooters were previously involved in a harassing, 
abusive, or oppressive manner. Early signs for workplace violence include insults, passive-aggressive 
activities, dramatic or irrational demands, and unexpected and unjustified whining or complaining 
[24]. Possibly, the insider intends to gain some benefit by harming other employees. However, 
workplace violence is not in scope and will not be addressed in the paper in detail. 
3. Attack Vectors and Techniques 
It is paramount for enterprises to identify the technologies, tools, and practices that 
cybercriminals use to implement insider threat attacks. This is due to the potential destruction they 
cause—examples include suspension of operations, loss of intellectual property, and reputational 
harm as they have easy access to systems and a greater window of opportunity to infiltrate. Through 
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insider threat incidents, the practices of insiders can be identified and consequently combated with 
suitable defenses. This section will identify common methods cybercriminals use of insider threats to 
compromise an organization’s network environment to gain access to valuable assets. 
3.1. Privilege Escalation Techniques 
The compromise and subsequent misuse of privileged access accounts have shown to be a 
typical trend within major insider security breaches [25]. A privilege escalation attack is a technique 
that grants an attacker elevated access to protected sensitive resources by taking advantage of design 
flaws or configuration errors. This can be achieved via two methods: vertical or horizontal privilege 
escalation. Vertical privilege escalation involves the attacker granting himself higher privileges 
usually created for higher-access users [26]. This allows the insider to execute unauthorized actions 
to manipulate the information system. An attacker can typically accomplish this by executing kernel-
level operations allowing unauthorized code execution [27]. Horizontal privilege escalation involves 
the attacker using the level of accesses they have been granted but assumes the identity of someone 
with similar privileges to gain access that he may not have [28]. For instance, Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices, such as intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) can be accessed by a group of people with a 
specific role (e.g., vendor engineer or management personnel) in the industrial control system (ICS). 
Therefore, if an insider can compromise and escalate his credentials, he can disrupt and modify 
critical systems to gain access to assets. There are several privilege escalation methods, using which 
the insiders can get access to the required resources. This also includes access token manipulation 
(e.g., copying an access token, developing a new process with an impersonated token, leveraging 
username and password to generate a token), bypass user account control (e.g., execute component 
object model (COM) objects with administrative privileges without permissions), and dynamic-link 
library (DLL) preloading (e.g., placing a malicious DLL in the system to execute). 
3.2. Exfiltration Attacks 
The objective of insider threat is to locate the “crown jewels” and move the jewels out of the 
protected network. This is referred to as data exfiltration which is defined as “the unauthorized 
copying, transfer, or retrieval of data from a computer or server” [29]. The methods for transferring 
this data outside of the protected areas include overt, tunneled, or covert channels [30]. Overt 
channels are accredited open communications that involve a level of trust within an organization. 
Examples include Cloud sync storage, such as the internet file hosting service Dropbox or FTP that is 
used to send files off-site. Hence, a malicious insider can use Dropbox to copy files and then 
immediately delete them from the folder. As a Dropbox user, even when you sync and delete a file 
from Dropbox, that Dropbox keeps a copy of that deleted file for 30 days for retrieval. Thereafter, he 
can recover the files from an external location. Furthermore, insiders can gain access to the targeted 
system of a more physical nature via removable USB devices [31]. They can be used to exfiltrate 
sensitive information from network endpoints whilst being concealed due to their size. Additionally, 
they can introduce malicious code onto a network endpoint that compromises the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of sensitive information [31]. 
3.3. Phishing Emails and APTs 
UIT can cause substantial harm to an organization’s information system. An outsider cyber-
criminal can take advantage of an insider through techniques such as social engineering (phishing 
emails), an attack vector in the art of manipulation, and network attacks such as APTs [32]. Attackers 
can gather company email addresses to send spear-phishing to attempt to infect specific or generic 
insiders. For example, most organizations have generic email addresses for their employees. Once 
the attacker has figured out the algorithm for the company addresses, they can reach a plethora of 
users [33]. Furthermore, social networks such as LinkedIn will also offer a range of users for an 
attacker to choose, as they provide easily accessible email addresses [34]. Moreover, social media sites 
like Facebook and Twitter make it effortless to gather personal information that can be used in 
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custom-tailored emails that will elicit the trust of a victim [35]. For instance, the software company 
Sophos found that 40% of social media users have been infiltrated by phishing attacks [36]. Hence, 
these practices cybercriminals use have demonstrated considerable ingenuity and refinery in 
formulating these emails to insider personnel. 
As aforementioned, APTs are sophisticated technologies that cybercriminals use to break into 
systems, stay hidden within networks, and keep long term access to data. APTs leverage insider 
threat as cyber-criminals focus on using the hijacked credentials of current employees or business 
partners to compromise targeted systems of valuable data [37]. Furthermore, an unintentional 
insider (UI) can fall victim to an APT by being utilized as an information harvesting point. A UI may 
have been convinced to click on a malicious link that delivers the APT, acting as an entry point, and 
granting full access to network information [33]. A key factor in the success of these attacks is that 
traditional network systems cannot detect these types of threats. For instance, threats exploiting zero-
day vulnerabilities cannot be stopped by the widely expanded signature-based endpoint security 
products as the signature is not readily accessible yet. Likewise, the security firm Mandiant indicated 
that 100% of insider attacks had anti-virus perimeter security in place [38]. Thus, emphasizing the 
need for security and awareness training for UIs to be aware of this risk as opposed to technical 
security. 
4. Cyber Kill Chain 
For a malicious insider to proceed and execute an attack, there are multiple steps that need to be 
completed [4]. These steps adapted by Lockheed Martin are the ‘kill chain’ [39]. Stopping attack at 
any stage results in the disruption of the whole attack. Hence, improving defense threat intelligence 
at all phases of the kill chain allows a defender to deny future attacks earlier on in the kill chain. It 
should be noted that the cyber kill chain was initially proposed for analyzing external threats. It was, 
however, noted in this work that the kill chain can be an efficient approach for studying the internal 
threat. 
4.1. Reconnaissance 
The initial aim of a malicious insider to undertake is a search for valuable data. This 
reconnaissance phase involves investigating within the systems they already have access to or to find 
systems that can gain access to the valuable data [40]. It could begin as a curiosity about where their 
access boundaries lie or accessing information that is not relevant to their position. The insider could 
ask co-workers vague questions about the organization, conduct searches on data, or delegate data 
to another individual. The malicious insider can achieve this through privilege escalation techniques 
such as vertical privilege escalation [26]. For example, a malicious insider who has gained 
unauthorized access to a user account can see what the compromised user can do and what systems 
they have access to. The user may be able to download the software freely or write scripts from this 
account. This gives rise to potential exploitation as they could find a vulnerability or configuration 
errors to become an administrator of the computer system. Moreover, companies can ignorantly 
reveal knowledge about their businesses that can be exploited for a cybercriminal’s advantage [33]. 
For example, corporate websites can disclose information such as contact addresses and partners’ 
information which can be profitable for an attack. Additionally, press releases and public white 
papers also provide advantageous information on what anti-virus software the company is using, 
alongside the names of the academics involved in their research. From this, a malicious insider can 
learn the target’s activities as they show what work is done within the company. They also show the 
template for the company’s publications; these could be used to design fake documents that could 
trick employees [33]. Furthermore, employees often leak sensitive information without knowing it 
via social networking sites, typically stating their employer’s name giving rise to target identification. 
An insider can find sensitive project names and gain more information on specialists who want 
potential recruiters to see their profile on LinkedIn. 
Moreover, dating applications may be used by employees within organizations. An external 
attacker could cross-reference LinkedIn or Facebook to “catfish” or manipulate an employee involved 
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in critical infrastructure into acting as an insider threat [41]. Although, organizations cannot regulate 
the personal lives of employees, yet the critical infrastructure entities should consider when 
reviewing applications possible insider polarization vectors. To mitigate the reconnaissance phase 
for insider threats, organizations need to prevent insider radicalization due to perceived personal 
bias or chilling effects. The personnel needs to be repeatedly informed of their privacy rights in the 
workplace through training, login screens, and signs and that their activities are constantly being 
monitored. Moreover, users should know a clear chain-of-command and should have access to a 
reporting mechanism to testify any suspicious insider activity. 
4.2. Weaponization 
This phase involves the insider creating a “remote” access malware weapon (e.g., Citadel for 
stealing the credentials) tailored to a specific vulnerability within the company. The Citadel malware 
has been used to steal online banking credentials and other financial information by altering the 
website on the fly in a local browser at the user’s end. In many cases, insiders directly exploit 
vulnerabilities already existing in the targeted systems (e.g., web application vulnerabilities). In some 
cases, insiders can use tools already available in the organization for their attacks. We use the term 
“remote” to refer to the type of exploit rather than the location of the attacker, which in this case can 
be within the organizational infrastructure, as well as an external who may be colluding with an 
employee. Typically, application data files such as Microsoft Office or Adobe Portable Document 
Format (PDF) serve as the weaponized deliverable [39]. An attacker, if successful, can implement an 
APT with an infected PDF file to a targeted insider. Moreover, the APT relies on targeting 
unintentional insiders with watering hole attacks, spear-phishing, and drive-by infections to push 
their malware onto the targeted infrastructure. If malware on an organization’s system records the 
password, then this can provide attackers with the key to information systems. To disrupt this phase 
of the kill chain, two-factor authentication could be implemented that involves password systems 
that require a second step, such as answering extra security questions. 
The malware can be transferred onto a USB drive despite cybersecurity awareness and training, 
is to plug a lost USB drive into an organization’s computer system to identify the owner [41]. These 
forms of social engineering attacks can be implemented by nation-state ATPs to infect the corporate’s 
critical infrastructure through an un-cyber-hygienic employee. This form of infiltration occurred in 
2008 where the Agent.BTZ malware was spread through the Department of Defense critical 
infrastructures. Agent.BTZ (aka, Autorun) is a worm that principally spreads itself via removable 
devices such as USB drives with spyware. This worm propagates by making an AUTORUN.INF file 
to the root of each drive with the malicious.dll file. The malware was reportedly spread by the 
Russian state-sponsored Uroburos APT. The Uroburos malware scans for the presence of Agent.BTZ 
on target systems and remains inactive if Agent.BTZ is present. The Uroburos malware is 
sophisticated as it is designed to infiltrate an entire network and extract the data back to the attacker. 
The malware can also infect air-gapped systems such as infecting transient host systems and USBs. 
One of the most dangerous weaponization examples of insider threat is a malicious nation-state 
sponsored APT proxy that compromises sensitive data from an organization as part of a multi-vector 
warfare campaign. For example, Securonix Chief Scientist Igor Baikalov, an ICCIT Fellow quotes, 
“We do see quite a bit of employees offering their corporate credentials for sale advertised on the 
dark web—is a lot cheaper and faster than hacking your way into a corporate network and then 
looking for the right level of access. Besides willing insiders, coercion in the form of blackmail, 
extortion, and other threats has been made easy by the availability of massive amounts of very 
sensitive information from the breaches at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Anthem, 
Yahoo, and others.” From this, nation-states could build pertinent profiles for potential targets. 
4.3. Delivery 
This stage involves the transmission of the weapon to the intended target through different 
steps. This may involve only a few steps if the attack is straightforward. For example, when an insider 
just gets hold of some assets to whom he has access or by compromising the credentials of some 
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colleagues to get access. However, in many cases, the insider carries out a sophisticated attack that 
requires many steps, which may require an insider to exploit several vulnerabilities, perhaps inject 
some code and so forth. 
The attack vector in the former case would involve an exfiltration attack. For example, the insider 
would use a USB device to upload potentially damaging malware to the organization’s systems either 
unintentionally or intentionally [42]. Moreover, an insider could use Dropbox to copy files and access 
them from an external location. Furthermore, the attacker could send infected emails in a phishing 
attack [22]. They could customize email messages using social engineering techniques via social 
media accounts to target insider employees and business associates. To disrupt this step in the kill 
chain, the staff needs to be trained to recognize and report these phishing emails. In the latter case, 
the attack vector would involve several complex steps [43]. For example, an insider can install 
malware that could steal the credentials (e.g., Citadel, through an email phishing campaign). Once 
an insider does that, he can use this stolen information to gain access to target a hosted web service 
dedicated to vendors. 
Now, to execute a command on an application, the insider is required to compromise the 
machine. To do that, the insider exploits a known vulnerability (e.g., web application vulnerability 
such as “xmlrpc.php” is used to execute scripts within web applications) and look for the relevant 
target for propagation (e.g., doing reconnaissance to locate and identify the server holding customer 
information, e.g., credit card, human resource documents, and other confidential information). On 
Windows, this can be done through querying Active Directory with internal Windows tools using 
the standard Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) protocol. Move on, once the insider has 
identified the target, he looks for access privileges (e.g., domain admin privileges using a well-known 
attack technique called pass-the-hash to gain access to an NT hash token) to affect it. Lastly, the 
insider creates a new account using the stolen privileges and adds this account to the domain admin 
group. 
4.4. Exploitation and Installation 
The exploitation stage is where the malware’s weapon program code activates, targets, and 
exploits the network’s vulnerability. For example, an insider can still exploit the vulnerability by 
privilege escalation methods such as accessing someone else’s user account that has lower privileges 
than themselves [28]. Installation of the remote access allows the adversary to maintain persistence 
inside the environment. Hence, a developer could modify the source code or introduce malware that 
will inevitably harm the organization. For example, they could infiltrate a code into a system and the 
execution of the code could cause databases to be destroyed [44]. Additionally, an insider could 
interfere with data by creating unauthorized changes of the deletions, making the data inoperable. 
This method involves slowly destroying data over time, by the time the company notices, these 
restoring backups are also damaged, which sets the company back drastically. 
For example, system administrators, who are privileged users, have authority and access to 
sensitive salient data and can turn rogue with severe consequences. Such as, a network administrator 
locked the city of San Francisco out of the FiberWAN network. This network served as the 
infrastructure that governed police records, payroll, and city hall systems. The administrator had 
become disgruntled as he felt that his job was in danger that he locked the system. A rogue system 
administrator could deploy malware or Ransomware onto critical infrastructure. For example, in 
2015, the BlackEnergy malware attacked several Ukrainian power plants. The system administrators 
were targeted by a phishing email that loaded the malware onto the system for which the attackers 
could gather credentials and gain control of the electricity systems. 
4.5. Command and Control (C2) 
The Command and Control (C2) phase is where the insider takes over the system in the targeted 
environment. In traditional systems, C2 infrastructure may be absent or is not required to perform a 
simple insider attack. However, to perform complex and APT related insider attacks, this is required. 
An employee who has access to the system control and data acquisition (SCADA) interfaces can 
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control the industrial systems giving rise to potential destruction by mishandling his access to these 
systems [44]. As such, if an insider worked in a dangerous chemical plant, he could control the valves 
that aid the release of poisonous chemicals into the environment. Furthermore, employee negligence 
can lead to remotely accessing computer systems. They could do this by connecting to a public Wi-Fi 
area where there is an insecure network but that could be compromised by an APT designed to target 
negligent employees. For example, in 2013, an American software developer outsourced his job to a 
consulting firm in China. The negligent insider surfed his social media and emails during his working 
days for which his credentials were being used to remotely access the company systems. This means 
that a foreign agent could access that organization’s data and systems for malicious intent. 
4.6. Intrusion and Takeover Complete 
At this stage, the insider works to achieve the objective of the attack, including data acquisition 
and exfiltration, the elevation of privileges, or the possible intrusion of another target. For instance, 
an insider may use privilege escalation once more to consider other possible systems that contain 
valuable data. Through this demonstration of insider threat attacks and their relevance to the kill 
chain, is the presentation that insider threat can extend and blend throughout all phases of the kill 
chain. As both technical and non-technical tools can be executed for an insider to compromise an 
organization, the kill chain is especially relevant for vigilant preliminary defense strategies to be 
distinguished at the stages. Now, Table 1 shows scenarios for insider threat activities in line with 
different phases of the cyber kill chain method where the operator’s activities denote insider threat 
behavior. 
Table 1. Insider threat and kill chain method. 
Stage Insider Activities Tools/Techniques 
Recruitment/ 
Tipping 
An engineer hands in his resignation, unknown to 
his team at the time he was leaving to resume 
duty with a competitor. 
Email or paper. 
Reconnaissance 
For four months, the engineer visited some 
network shares on the system that contain data 
from different divisions of the organization. He 
explored several areas for accessing documents, 
opening files, and browsing directories. 
PCs, browsers, webpages, ping 
sweeps, social networks, port 
scanning, network sharing, 
Telnet/R-login. 
Exploitation 
The organization did not control the critical and 
sensitive zones of its network with the correct 
level of permissions. Therefore, open and free 
access to data and information was available to 
those who have access. 
Remote access tool (RAT) and 
exploit kits, particularly, 
Blackshades—Blackhole; 
DarkComet—Nuclear; Bozok—
Redkit; Poison ivy—Styx; 
Njrat—Sweet orange; 
Apocalypse—Infinity; and 
Browser exploitation framework 
(BEF). 
Acquisition 
Once the engineer had discovered the data he 
wanted to steal, he downloaded a piece of 
software that is designed to create backups. He 
installed it on his system and configured it to 
retrieve the needed files from the network and 
secure them in a single file. He was sensible 
enough to configure the software to perform 
incremental backup after the initial backup. This 
means if there is any change or addition to the file 
location, the software will only add the new 
changes. 
Backup software—Acronis True 
Image, EaseUS ToDo Backup, 
Paragon Backup & Recovery, 
NovaBackup, and Genie 
Timeline. 
Exfiltration 
Once the engineer was done, he unplugs his 
endpoint from the network and copies the backed-
up file to a drive. 
USB thumb drive, Hard disk. 
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5. Defense Strategies 
The insider threat is a complex problem, with many researchers proposing a layered defense 
approach involving policies, procedures, and technical controls. Based on the ENISA report [4], the 
following elements contain the best practices for defending and combating the risk of insider threat. 
Table 2 summarizes the potential targets and associated defense approaches. 
Table 2. Summary of defense strategies. 
Strategies Authors Targets Defense Approaches 
Definitions of 
security policies 
regarding insider 
threats 
Omar [1], CERT 
Common Sense 
Guide to 
Mitigating Insider 
Threats [45] 
Gaps in policies 
Concise and coherent; 
penalties for violating rules 
Pre-employment and 
monitoring 
suspicious or 
disruptive behavior 
Shaw et al. [46], 
Greitzer et al. [47] 
Non-trustworthy 
candidates, disruptive 
behavior 
Background checks, enforce 
policies and procedures 
Prevention of data 
exfiltration methods 
Hunker et al. [48], 
Scott et al. [41] 
Data leaving critical 
systems (copied, 
transferring, USBs, etc.) 
Shadow copy creation, audit 
media devices, virtual desktop 
infrastructure environments, 
data loss prevention 
Strict access controls 
and monitoring 
policies for 
privileged users 
Giani et al. [30] 
Oracle Database 
Vault [49] 
System administrators and 
privileged users, sabotage 
previous employees 
Disable system access for 
required users, strict 
encryption solutions, principle 
of least privilege, protect user 
data from DBAs 
Separation of duties 
Cappelli et al. [14], 
Iyer et al. [50] 
Privileged users, system 
misconfiguration 
Strict organizational rules, 
collaborative network systems 
Segregation of duties Moore et al. [51] 
Authentication attempts 
suspicious activities 
Audit logs, dashboards, alerts, 
and alarms for security 
analysts to inspect 
Indicators of 
compromise 
Mihai et al. [52] Intrusion kill chain 
Use of a security incident and 
event management (SIEM) 
Human behavioral 
and psychological 
approaches 
Greitzer et al. [53] 
Unintentional insider 
threat (UIT) from social 
engineering 
Collecting and analyzing the 
data for behavioral and 
patterns 
 
 Range of insider threats 
(mostly the traitor, 
masquerader, and 
unintentional perpetrator) 
 
Liu et al. [11] APT intrusion kill chain 
Nurse et al. [22] 
Motivation behind 
malicious threats and 
unintentional human 
factors 
Technical and behavioral 
aspects 
Chen et al. [54] 
Insider threats based on the 
access structure 
Community anomaly 
detection through logs of 
collaborative environments 
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5.1. Definitions of Security Policies Regarding Insider Threats 
A non-technical defense measure is enforcing consistent and clear security policies to employees 
of all levels of the organization [1]. Insiders will exploit any gaps in policies to damage the 
organization, therefore ensuring the policies are concise and coherent with emphasis on the reason 
behind the policies is essential. Moreover, if these policies are misunderstood or not received 
consistently, then it can result in insider disgruntlement and promote malicious activity. A common 
practice that organizations use is that all employees receive and sign a copy of these policies. Through 
this, the employees are made aware of what is expected from their job roles and the penalties for 
violation of these policies are clearly agreed upon [45]. 
5.2. Pre-Employment and Monitoring Suspicious or Disruptive Behavior 
The first line of defense to mitigate insider threat begins at the hiring stage. Potentially non-
trustworthy candidates can be identified at the application stage by conducting background checks 
such as criminal convictions, credit issues, verification of credentials, and previous employment 
regarding competency [4]. Provisions need to be enforced not just for employees but also for 
contractors and subcontractors who need to be investigated under the same scrutiny. A common 
practice for organizations is to train managerial roles to recognize inappropriate behavior of 
employees. They can consistently enforce policies and procedures and respond to any act of 
violation [46]. Moreover, if financial gain is a primary motive for an insider, then abrupt changes in 
an employee’s wealth could be a sign of potentially malicious activity [47]. Furthermore, policies 
regarding the reporting of disruptive behavior of a co-worker can help in defending against the 
insider threat. 
Sometimes, those mitigation strategies can carry significant costs to an organization which is 
why strategic investment needs to be implemented in securing highly sensitive resources. Research 
has indicated that there is apprehension over the inefficiency of cyber security investments [55]. The 
investments are measured in isolation of other current investments within the organization. 
However, increasing the amount of investments tends to have a diminishing benefit beyond a certain 
point. It is argued that the current investment models rely on an expected value as opposed to a 
probability distribution of an outcome. Moreover, these investments assume that the mitigations are 
independent with drastic preventative effect. 
5.3. Prevention of Data Exfiltration Methods 
To prevent data exfiltration attacks, organizations need a thorough understanding of where and 
how data can leave their critical systems. Different device types (e.g., Android devices for covert data 
exfiltration) that are used for exfiltration can present different challenges, but there are methods to 
control and audit these media devices. For example, Microsoft Windows has developed group 
policies where administrators can determine which devices can be installed on systems [56]. 
Furthermore, some organizations have developed features onto their systems where, if files are 
moved, a shadow copy of that file is automatically created [48]. This can determine who has copied 
the file and what contents the file has within it. To help mitigate this risk further, companies should 
allow for company-owned removable devices that are encrypted before a file is moved to it [45]. 
To disrupt the delivery step in the kill chain, virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) environments 
can circumvent the delivery process. This is where all data are stored onto remote servers and that 
the user only interacts with a local application on the computer. Through this, an insider cannot 
download any data or perform an exfiltration attack. A system administrator can concentrate on 
managing and securing the servers with the users being held responsible for their desktops. 
Moreover, the features involved in digital rights management (DRM) can be implemented to detect 
any form of data leak through watermarks or print prohibition controls [41]. Furthermore, data loss 
prevention (DLP) is where vendor tools are securing the data when it is in transit, rest, and at 
endpoints. It may also include network monitoring and involve mechanisms to deter any threats. 
However, DLP is not sufficient enough for the evolving threat of insiders as it was not built with 
Electronics 2020, 9, x 12 of 28 
 
insiders in mind. A determined insider threat actor will be able to circumvent the controls involved 
in DLP. Therefore, by implementing user activity monitoring (UAM), organizations can identify any 
suspicious behavior and mitigate any risks whilst maintaining business continuity. Through this 
user-centric method, any suspicious behavior can be extracted by case-by-case analysis. 
5.4. Strict Access Controls and Monitoring Policies for Privileged Users 
For an organization to mitigate the risk of insider threats, they must guarantee that their system 
administrators and privileged users are to be trustworthy. Many individuals who commit insider 
threat sabotage were previous employees; therefore, organizations must disable system access for 
these users once they have left the company. Besides, organizations should implement strict 
encryption solutions before allowing privileged users access. This is due to privileged users having 
access to encryption tools which pose a risk as they could encrypt valuable information (claiming as 
their personal information) and decline to produce the key [45]. 
Furthermore, a key factor that influences the success of privilege escalation with insider threat 
is the principle of least privilege (POLP) [30]. This involves the operation of every program and user 
using the least amount of privilege necessary to complete a task. Through this, the attacker may not 
be able to reach beyond that user’s privileges despite having full access to an individual user account. 
They must escalate through other ways, such as a faulty program that operates at a higher level of 
privilege. Therefore, POLP produces several layers of complexity and reduces the likelihood of the 
attacker’s success. In this direction, Oracle has a product called Oracle Database Vault, which is 
designed to protect user data from Database Administrators (DBAs) who are typically high-
privileged users [49]. 
5.5. Separation of Duties 
Another process that organizations use to mitigate against this threat is the implementation of 
separation of duties for all roles including privileged users with at least two people needed to alter 
modifications on the system. From the list of controls produced, strict access controls and monitoring 
policies for privileged users is of great importance. This is because of the increased risk they pose to 
an organization’s valuable data due to their technical ability and the easy concealment of their actions 
in modifying systems. To prevent this, organizations have used non-repudiation methods (signatures 
or certificates) to monitor single employee’s online activity, regardless of their level of access [14]. 
Therefore, organizations can access information to demonstrate who has been conducting malicious 
activity. They can achieve this by configuring systems to enable non-repudiation methods via policies 
and technologies. Yet, these methods tend to be designed by current privileged users such as 
administrators. To overcome this, organizations have established that multiple privileged users 
should develop network systems collaboratively. Moreover, organizations can observe that their 
employees are only accessing the necessary resources involved in their job role. They achieve this by 
thoroughly checking employees’ daily activities (based on their role and tasks assigned) and any 
activity outside their boundaries can be deemed as suspicious. Also, this relates to the principle of 
least privilege where strict organizational rules let employees have access only to resources that are 
required for their job role [50]. 
5.6. Segregation of Duties 
The segregation of duties refers to the assignment of steps in a process that eliminates instances 
where a person can have an excessive amount of control over the process. This may lead to theft or 
other fraudulent attacks. To further control access management, organizations can implement 
segregation of duties [4], for example, per defined roles. They can achieve this through protocols and 
technical means, for which some systems require multiple users to modify information systems. For 
example, someone could raise a purchase order for £2 million, but they would not be able to approve 
it. Thus, a senior manager with approver roles will only have the authority to approve it in their cost 
center and the application database will audit this event. A single worker should not be able to make 
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any changes to any technical system without the permission of another. As such, a peer review of a 
developer’s code can be applied to reduce any risk of malicious activity. Hence, organizations should 
have at least two system administrators to reduce and combat this risk. Furthermore, organizations 
rely heavily on audit logs to identify authentication attempts that are collected and analyzed to show 
any form of suspicious activity [51]. The auditing role can be separated from a single administrator 
to enforce separation of duties and to reduce the risk of an organization becoming victimized by a 
sole administrator. From a technical point of view, Table 3 provides examples of security information 
and event management (SIEM) actions. Following the process of a kill chain, organizations need to 
put controls and stoppers in place that could flag any unusual occurrence as a way of dashboards, 
alerts, and alarms for security analysts to inspect. Furthermore, the system and network should be 
fortified to stop and disallow the process of kill chain by an attacker. Access control lists (ACLs) are 
used to filter the network traffic that controls incoming or outgoing traffic from source to destination 
through setting a set of rules on whether to forward or block a packet at the router’s interface. This 
brings a matrix (shown in Table 3) for action by the United States Department of Defense. 
Table 3. Matrix for action. 
Phase Detect Deny Disrupt Degrade Deceive Destroy 
Reconnaissance 
Website 
Traffic 
Firewall Access 
Control List 
(ACL) 
- - - - 
Weaponization 
Network 
IDS 
Network IPS - - - - 
Delivery 
Cautious 
User 
Proxy Filter 
In-line 
Antivirus 
Scheduling in 
Queuing 
- - 
Exploitation 
Host-
based IDS 
Patch 
Data 
Execution 
Prevention 
- - - 
Installation 
Host-
based IDS 
Modified 
system 
Antivirus - - - 
Command and 
Control 
Network 
IDS 
ACL Network IPS Tarpit 
DNS 
Redirect 
- 
Action on 
Objective 
Log files - Network IPS 
Quality of 
Service 
Honey 
Pot 
- 
5.7. Indicators of Compromise (IOC) 
A major goal of the kill chain is to map the intelligence and tools available in an organization 
environment with the actions conducted by the insider [52]. However, the implementation of the 
matrix of action may indicate a secure environment, but more pertinent is the recognition of a zero-
day exploit. With the use of a security incident and event management (SIEM), intelligence can be 
gathered about specific indicators of compromise (IOC) that will allow the security analyst to track 
the insider staff activities. These indicators of compromise can be human or technical, a few examples 
of which are given in Table 4. The first step in using a SIEM tool is to set a baseline to determine what 
is normal and abnormal. Besides, it is necessary to determine what information needs to log on to the 
SIEM tool. A few examples are: 
1. Record of physical access to the office areas including restricted and sensitive areas, 
2. Record of access to hosts and servers, 
3. Database activities, 
4. Vulnerability data, 
5. Individual user activities, 
6. Configuration data, 
7. Security device logs, 
8. Application activity logs, 
9. Active directory. 
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Table 4. Indicators of compromise. 
Indicators of Compromise (Insider Threat) 
Human Technological 
12 months plus unused vacation An increasing # of logins, variation in remote/local 
Consistent first in and last out of office Logging into the network at odd times 
Life change/marital status Remote logins using employee credential 
Lay-off notification Changes in website visited work and personal 
Passed over for promotion/raise Increased printer usage 
Disciplinary action Export of large reports/downloads report 
A SIEM signature can be generated for insider attacker logging to account outside office hours 
through common event format (CEF) or common event expression (CEE). The signature may include 
the details depending on the event standard in use, such as username, virtual private network (VPN) 
account name, hostname, and remote connection protocol. 
Another important IOC to detect potential malicious insiders is anomaly detection (AD). This is 
especially helpful in scenarios where it is difficult to detect an insider using traditional and 
straightforward approaches. Using AD, one can detect anomalies in the user’s patterns. For example, 
an employee for his daily tasks’ accesses 20% of a table; then one day this employee downloads the 
entire table and copies it into a file. This is a clear anomaly that may indicate an insider attack. Of 
course, being an anomaly there could be legitimate reasons for it. However, flagging it is important. 
A risk rating is then assigned to the risks involved and risk scores can be increased by the 
magnitude of deviation from normal activities and the sensitivity of assets involved. A list of 
suspicious or monitored users can also be created and placed on a dashboard. Any spike on the data 
generated on the dashboard by a suspected user profile can indicate a possible intelligence on a 
possible threat, which should be investigated and monitored. An organization can also create alerts 
and alarms on possible threats or compromise of the systems or network and create automatic 
responses. A SIEM signature can be created to achieve this task. SIEM signatures should be assigned 
to individuals that require monitoring to reduce false positives [57]. 
5.8. Human Behavioral and Psychological Approaches 
To better comprehend the respective threat of insider activity, three elements need to be 
considered. One such element consists of the psychological factors involved in these attacks, and 
what impact technologies, such as social media, have on insider attacks. 
Greitzer et al. [53] addressed the unintentional insider threat (UIT) cases that can be derived 
from social engineering exploits by collecting and analyzing the data from UIT social engineering 
incidents to recognize the likely behavioral and patterns. Recent attacks, such as the U.K. National 
Health Service WannaCry ransomware attack which partly depends on internal users for initial 
infection, highlight the increasing role of the malicious insiders in cyber-attack campaigns [58]. The 
literature evidence suggests that there is high heterogeneity across crude data, indicating that the 
effectiveness of security measures varies significantly, and no solution can mitigate an insider threat. 
Liu et al. [11] extended the range of insider threats (mostly the traitor, masquerader, and 
unintentional perpetrator) by involving those relevant early-stage threats which are all lined up with 
the APT intrusion kill chain. Nurse et al. [22] proposed a framework that identifies the key elements 
which concentrate not only on the noteworthy events and indicators, i.e., technical and behavioral 
aspects of the potential attacks, but also on the motivation behind malicious threats and the human 
factors related to unintentional ones. Chen et al. [54] introduced a community anomaly detection 
system (CADS) that detects insider threats based on the access logs of collaborative environments 
and based on the observation that typical users follow community structures based on the subjects 
accessed. 
Psychosocial behaviors to be analyzed include lateness, absenteeism, unruly clashes with co-
workers or superiors, disregard, disgruntlement, performance stress, and self-centeredness. Such 
employees can perpetrate sabotage by spoofing, misuse of computer functions in creating a back 
Electronics 2020, 9, x 15 of 28 
 
door, executing unauthorized software scripts on the organization systems. This information can be 
recovered majorly from co-workers and human resources. 
Exploring the human and psychological factors involved in insider threat needs to be critically 
considered. For instance, Shaw and Stock [46] found that insiders who score higher on personality 
traits such as narcissism are more likely to cause malicious activity. Moreover, research has 
established that certain behavioral traits need to be measured; these include arrogance, self-
centeredness, and risk-taking [59]. If specific traits are related to insider threat, then prevention and 
deterrence of any activity taking place can be implemented. Furthermore, research has shown that 
emotional states and psychological disorders of employees can aid in malicious activity [60]. For 
example, in cases of extreme stress, a financial crisis can exuberate malicious behaviors [46]. 
Additionally, people with psychological disorders such as addiction (gambling) are more likely to 
engage in malevolent activity than those without a psychological disorder [6]. This highlights the 
importance of understanding complex human behaviors within corporate environments and how it 
can support the identification of suspicious data handling by an insider. 
The criticality of insider threat also involves the use of technologies such as personal devices and 
social media. Even though the use of personal devices has grown in popularity, they come with an 
increased risk of fraud [17]. Despite whether personal devices reduce the cost of supplying company-
owned devices, organizations need to deliberate whether it is worth the risk of severe data breaches. 
Moreover, social media is critical in the development of insider threat risk as attackers can locate 
sensitive information that can be used to their advantage. This creates a high vulnerability risk as 
organizational campaigns can be accessed with vital information on trade secrets. Besides, external 
outsiders can use target identification to exploit possible insiders. Thus, organizations should not 
underestimate the effect of social media [35]. 
Mostly, detection techniques are based on the technical aspects. Therefore, it is required to fill a 
gap in detecting insider threats by the current tools, such as user activity monitoring (UAM) and user 
behavioral analytics (UBA) [61]. Cassidy [61] developed a factor-tree model of the incident (intended 
harm) lifecycle that can be used to systematically generate scenarios across five states: 
predispositions, stressors, grievances, ideation, and planning and prep. 
5.9. Organizational Risks and Ethical/Privacy Considerations 
Organizations must understand the criticality of insider threat, as the associated risks can be 
detrimental. However, organizations are more concerned with outside rather than inside threats as 
the enemy is perceived as beyond the organization. This is evidenced by the lack of investment used 
in insider security. For example, the State of Security report [62] found that corporations only spend 
around 11% of their revenue on security defenses aimed specifically at mitigating insider threat. 
Considering the amount of risk involved, this is an insufficient amount of investment needed for the 
prevention and detection of these threats. Likewise, companies are not going to invest more money 
into defending against this threat if they believe it to be insignificant. For example, Ponemon’s survey 
found that although 61% of employees feel that insider threat is a high risk, only 44% believed their 
company puts insider threat as a top priority [63]. This emphasizes the fact that organizations 
perceive themselves as ill-equipped yet are unmotivated to activate risk management. Moreover, 
corporations deem that the probability of being attacked as low risk, which has detrimental effects 
on any protocols being implemented in protecting against the insider threat. 
Another organizational aspect of insider threat can be shown through how companies deal with 
the threat once detected [22]. Kaspersky [10] found that these incidents are under-reported and that 
no notification was given outside the boundaries of the organization. It was identified that 
organizations are not responding appropriately as they do not have a clear understanding of the 
associated risks. Most likely proposing that organizations can develop their understanding by 
researching current and past threat landscapes such as the ENISA Threat Landscape [4]; these 
landscapes summarize the most prevalent cyber threats with strategic mitigation vectors for the 
respective threat. 
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Another important aspect is ethical and privacy considerations for insider threat detection. In 
this direction, Rashid et al. [64] suggested educating individuals to report certain behaviors that they 
perceive in their peers. These “characteristics of insiders at risk of becoming a threat” are imprecise 
(ethical flexibility, introversion, etc.) and can often be tough to quantify. At times, information 
security challenges shoot from inconsistent and differing technological standards. However, it has 
more happened because of the lack of awareness in understanding several ethical and social norms 
from one location to another [65]. Further, Greitzer et al. [66] explored social and ethical issues 
stemming from predictive insider threat monitoring and resolved by stakeholders and communities 
of interest. 
When an insider is violating ethical standard practices in the organization, he risks users’ private 
data, identity, and assets associated with that identity. Following unethical practices (intentionally or 
unintentionally) may also lead to severe consequences, such as leaking data to competitors, 
disrupting internal processes, or potentially bringing the whole business to a halt. It could be a great 
challenge to monitor and detect insiders without violating privacy laws and policies. 
While these policies are straightforward, there is a strict requirement of following the data 
protection requirements, such as due to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In general, 
for monitoring purposes, it is important to explicitly notify the employees that they and associated 
devices and resources are under the surveillance system to maintain data protection. In order to 
monitor and maintain ethical and privacy considerations, a rigorous information security policy is 
required to implement. Additionally, various internal processes are required to prevent unethical 
actions from insiders. For example, when developing software, it is helpful to have an inclusive 
history regarding the developers’ involvement and actions to the application, standardized code 
review practice, code change approval progression, and continuous static code analysis helps in 
detecting the unethical behavior among developers [67]. 
5.10. Detecting Insider Threats by Monitoring Disruptive Behavior 
As previously mentioned, there are many different methods for detecting insider threats. 
5.10.1. Detection by Monitoring Disruptive Behavior 
From these techniques, there is a clear indication that many of these attacks are detected through 
nontechnical means such as the monitoring of disruptive behavior of co-workers. Furthermore, 
Kaspersky [10] found that 47% of insider threat cases were reported by co-workers identifying 
disruptive behavior, so the education focus and awareness within organizations need to be 
encouraging employees to engage in this security domain [22]. Therefore, companies need to develop 
and build suitable defenses, incorporating the identification of co-worker behavior. Likewise, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)’s cybercrime survey [63] has identified that some organizations have 
included three elements for detecting and identifying insider threats. These include corporate 
controls (identifying and monitoring suspicious transaction behavior), corporate culture (reporting 
misconduct), and those not under the influence of management (third party or accidental discovery). 
At every period end, a business information report is created, which will highlight untrustworthy 
financial purchases that can be reviewed. They found that from 2005–2011, suspicious-transaction 
monitoring increased by 18%, and with that, methods such as whistle-blowing led to suspicious 
behavior being relayed to management. This emphasizes how critical these detection methods are for 
insider threats. However, Kaspersky’s [10] survey identified that information technology personnel 
reported 41% of irregularities in activity logs, signifying that non-technical defenses alone do not 
identify threats. 
5.10.2. Detection by Automated Tools 
It is also important for organizations to identify current automated detection software tools that 
can apply many prevention methods in one [63]. For example, Forcepoint insider threat by Raytheon 
is a new commercial software tool that can detect, prevent, establish, and identify suspicious activity 
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to reduce and stop data loss. For instance, the Command Center provides highly intuitive systems to 
identify any uncertain behavior that will heighten the risk of insider threat, whilst controlling what 
data to specifically collect from users. Thus, it is essential that corporations invest in technical 
defenses as well as non-technical to increase their breadth of security and reduce their overall risk. It 
is evident that monitoring the activity of employees and applying the segregation of duties is essential 
for insider risk management. This can be achieved by anomaly-based approaches, which can establish 
what normal activities the user is involved in [68]. However, these approaches can result in multiple 
challenges. For example, measuring the amount of deviancy needed to be a malicious insider, or to 
determine what the normal behavior against abnormal behavior is, if there is already a malevolent 
insider within the organization presents difficulties. Moreover, employees’ daily routines could 
change and vary depending on the demands placed on them including workload. Therefore, they 
could be asked to work longer hours or complete tasks dedicated to other employees, particularly if 
other employees are on leave, then workload will need to be covered. Hence, the anomalous behavior 
will be flagged as malicious and yet the behavior is not. Organizations should develop a system by 
careful management as employees can be accused of being a threat, representing the challenges 
involved in building strong suitable defenses for insider threats. 
Other challenges are involved in automated threat detection systems, including false alarms. 
This can result in a loss of availability where employees cannot gain access to the system and 
effectively complete tasks during a time-sensitive emergency. A loss of system availability can 
become a costly burden to an organization. Furthermore, the reputational damage of the organization 
can be compromised, including loss of revenue. Loss of availability, confidentiality, and integrity 
establishes a security breach. Strategies to reduce these errors involve using other models, including 
the intention model. This model is used to assess probable threats based on the psychological profiles 
of insiders. When an anomaly is detected involving the insider’s behavior, the intention model looks 
at the motives behind a user to see if they have any malicious intent. If there involves a substantial 
amount of motivation and interest, only then can the alarm be raised. 
5.10.3. Detection by Human Signals 
There is the current state of the art research into developing suitable defense systems due to the 
severity of insider threat. One example of this comes from researchers Hashem, Takabi, Ghasemigol, 
and Dantu [69] as they applied the use of human bio-signals in detecting malicious insider activity. 
They developed a framework for insider detection with 90% accuracy using electroencephalography 
(EEG) and electrocardiogram signals. This suggests that the brain and heart signals reveal 
information about malicious behaviors and could be an efficient solution in detecting insider threats. 
However, as acknowledged by the authors, it is inconvenient and unrealistic for users to wear the 
device all the time. Yet, this may not be an issue for the future as technology has already adapted 
smartwatches that can measure EEG signals. 
Axelrad et al. [70] introduced a Bayesian network model for the motivation and psychology of 
the malicious insider. Their work indicates three measures of prediction accuracy: error rate, 
quadratic loss, and logarithmic loss. It also describes two types of counterproductive behavior that is 
having 5 different levels, ranging from the lowest (report low incidence) to the highest indicating 
(high incidence). 
Moreover, Greitzer et al. [47] presented a description logics model for the psychological factors 
involved in identifying threats. The model involves various observable behaviors such as 
performance, stress, and confrontation. For each of the behaviors, there is a probability that 
approximates how frequently it occurs and how significant the behavior is to observing threats. 
However, as an observer is needed to measure whether the insider is exhibiting these behaviors, the 
assessment becomes subjective, which lacks reliability. A large number of ex-employers with a short 
average time spent with each activity may indicate unreliability. This can be detected from the 
background indicators [71]. Additionally, Brdiczka et al. [26] used psychological profiling regarding 
the Big-5 model involving social networks, behavioral, and word analysis as data for the profiling of 
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insider threats. However, the authors used gaming as their instrumentation, which has been criticized 
as not real data. 
A sufficient insider threat monitoring and detection framework is needed for early prediction 
and detection of risk. Despite this, the insider threat problem continues. The application of these 
approaches to real-life environments seems to be a common theme among research. As such, to 
conduct profiling, insiders need to give consent; this is challenging as it requires specific ethical 
considerations that cannot be ignored. However, the criticality of insider threat has been highlighted 
throughout this section, and to develop further understanding, incorporating technical, behavioral, 
and psychological assessments are essential. 
6. Open Problems and Future Directions 
This section presents two key aspects: open problems and future directions related to insider 
threats. 
6.1. Open Problems Related to the Insider Threat 
Due to the inextricable link between human behavior and the combination of technical and non-
technical aspects, providing a solution for insider threat for all organizations can be a multifarious 
problem. For example, understanding and mitigating insider threats can be complex due to the 
elements, such as outsourcing, globalization, and technological advances. These elements can blur 
the line between traditional insiders and external adversaries, such as terrorists who may conspire 
with physical insiders to access a system and its assets. 
According to the Ponemon Institute survey of privileged users [72], one of the biggest challenges 
for companies is having difficulty knowing if an action delivered by an insider is a justifiable threat. 
It is hard to detect malicious actions unless we have imposed high standards of security policies and 
controls in place within an organization. Therefore, it is extremely important to revisit the security 
policy and control measures in place and add new rules and controls as per the need of the 
organization in order to detect and get alerted about the actions of its employees. The security tools 
they have, harvest too many false positives and do not produce enough contextual information. 
Moreover, high-tech tools including endpoint monitoring for detection are not widely used [72]. 
Therefore, there is a need of improving these tools or develop new tools in line with the current cyber 
security requirements. 
The behavior involved in the insider threat incidents can be difficult to detect as the actions are 
consistent with the individual’s role and responsibilities. Another problem is that organizations are 
finding that enforcing privileged user access rights is challenging. It is difficult to keep up with the 
amount of access change requests that occur regularly and the time it takes to deliver access to 
privileged users takes a long time [72]. Furthermore, 30% of privileged users state that within their 
organization, it is still too expensive to monitor and control all privileged users, which is still a 
concern. A new problem is that organizations are allowing users who have administrative or root-
level access rights to work from home. This is problematic as keeping the data secure from the insider 
can be more challenging. Moreover, 41% of privileged users believe their organizations are not 
properly vetting background checks before receiving access rights. Therefore, there are still problems 
to be solved for organizations regarding the insider threat as the expansive nature of attacks can occur 
at any exploitation point within the company. 
6.2. Future Directions for Addressing the Insider Threat Categories 
This section highlights the future directions for addressing insider threats in different forms, 
targeting different subsystems of the organization. 
6.2.1. Collaborative Insider Threat 
Collaborative information systems (CISS) permit different groups of users to connect and 
collaborate over shared tasks. It is predicted that the greatest security threat to information systems 
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stems from insiders [54]. Several methods have been established to address the insider threat in 
collaborative settings. Formal access control frameworks are adapted to contextual scenarios. 
Knowing that access control is essential, but not adequate to promise safeguard, anomaly detection 
methods are proposed to detect deviations from the expected behavior. The access control 
mechanisms are the main protection method against insider threats [73]. Due to access control being 
broadly implemented in commercial information systems, databases, and software, it is overall 
successful in preventing insider attacks. However, more specialized attacks have been developed and 
circumvent security mechanisms. These attacks involve the collaboration of two or more insiders, 
which create challenging detection efforts. A model that is applicable to both single-step attacks and 
attacks with communication relays between insiders is helpful and a detection and collaborative 
approach will bridge data items. The transaction’s distance to a data item can also support detecting 
malicious information that is created by the insiders. 
Furthermore, the 2019 Insider Threat Report mentioned that the careless users cause most 
accidental breach (70%), while the users willfully ignoring policy (not malicious) and the users 
willfully causing harm are 66% and 62%, respectively, responsible for negligent and malicious data 
breaches [74]. The report emphasized that all teams and their members automatically adhere to 
company governance, compliance, and data-centric privacy and security policies upon creation. In 
such instances, a trust-based blockchain can be a good solution to protect the integrity of the 
information shared among the collaborative network peers, increasing their liability, and protecting 
their association by thwarting insider attacks [75]. Intrusion detection system (IDS) deployment can 
also become vulnerable to insider threats due to its interconnected and distributed nature [76]. An 
insider intruder can easily dominate any of the security nodes of the collaborative intrusion detection 
network and leave the entire security system vulnerable. Their work improves the insider attack 
detection accuracy by utilizing collaborative Snort node with blockchain certificates. 
Overall, it is imperative to keep auditing the data—identify where all your data currently 
exist—both at rest and in motion. Especially, track carefully all access to sensitive data as well as 
actions. 
6.2.2. Insider Threat on Personal Devices 
Boral et al. [77] developed a diamond theory to counter insider threats on personal devices (such 
as laptops and flash drives) involving four methods of increasing the security of personal devices: 
software design, information retrieval, detection methods, and policy design. Based on past research 
and incidents, they argue that the diamond theory is an effective solution to mitigating risks to a 
company. However, the work does not explain how this would be used to identify malicious insiders 
or insider threats, but only introduces the four design characteristics of the diamond theory. Further, 
Majeed et al. [78] discussed a diverse perception of security and privacy concerns in the Internet of 
Everything (IoE) by establishing insiders carrying personal smart devices to use within the 
organization. Awareness to the employees about legal compliance and ethical compliance is crucial 
and it should be a requirement for adopting the ethical framework within an organization and 
provisioning training. 
Moreover, security analysts of an organization need operative visual interfaces and interactive 
techniques that could detect security breaches and efficiently share threat information with the 
respective user or authority. A user behavior tool such as user behavior analytics (UBA) tool from 
IBM’s security analytics environment can provide a rigorous data analysis [79]. This tool is quite 
effective in terms of conducting a continuous analysis of individuals’ usage of their organizational IT 
networks and devices. This is a great way to effectively visualize the associated insider threats, 
security incidents, and associated data from various sources (e.g., HR systems) through a risk-focused 
dashboard, and aggregate risk levels associated with individual users, user groups, and overall 
system. 
Overall, it is important to keep track of individual usage, data access, and data storage on 
personal devices. 
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6.2.3. Trusted Insiders Exploiting Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 
Extensive research has been developed into various honeypot technologies, such as honeynets 
and honeytokens, to accumulate information on external threats [80]. Honeypots are trap systems or 
servers positioned within the network that attract targets for malicious users (such as insiders) and 
attackers. The honeytokens are fake digital data objects embedded among real data objects and 
utilized in exposing data misuse by insiders. However, it should be well investigated on how 
honeytokens can be implemented to catch insider threats. White and Panda [81] explored how 
honeytokens can be integrated to catch trusted insiders who want to exploit PII data. They found that 
by deploying internal PII honeytokens, they can be used as warning systems and they can detect 
prohibited behaviors before they have accelerated into detrimental data leaks. They can be deployed 
in numerous locations, such as the file space of the personal information and packets sent across the 
network. Further, Harilal et al. [82] collected a comprehensive dataset comprising interactive 
malicious insider threat instances involving both masqueraders and traitors. This was accomplished 
by building a gamified setting where the sales departments of competing companies (represented by 
groups) contacted a common set of customers. Unlike others, in this work, the malicious masquerader 
and traitor activities were performed by the actual users and not assumed to be injected into the 
dataset. 
It is important to verify the feasibility of using physical movement logs gathered via a building 
access control system [83]. This consists of an understanding of the layout and assets of the building 
and detection method of malicious insider behavior. A systematic framework that uses contextual 
knowledge about the system and its users can be helpful here, which can learn from historical data 
gathered to offer a suitable model for real movement behavior. The effectiveness of this framework 
needs to be demonstrated by using real-time data traces of the user movement. 
Overall, it is significant to restrict PII access and those who have access to PII must be monitored 
through their movement behavior and ask for the authentication. 
6.2.4. Malicious Insiders in the Cloud Environment 
Monitoring the patterns of malicious insiders who have access to a system is a noteworthy 
problem that is faced by providers in the Cloud environment. Although there are many benefits to 
Cloud users, there are some security issues. An insider threat detection model that uses sequential 
rule mining by associating incoming events against user profiles can be adopted [84]. Techniques 
such as machine learning algorithms and statistical modeling have been used to identify deviant user 
patterns in operating a system. Moreover, system calls can build profiles of malicious insiders in a 
system by using two methods: user-oriented model and process-oriented model [85]. For the user-
oriented model, the access patterns are acquired to create meaningful data to build a pattern for a 
specific user. The process-oriented model controls how processes are used to access files in a system. 
Moreover, an ontology-based framework for improving physical security and insider threat 
detection [86] can also be useful considering it supports threat detection using rule-based anomaly 
detection, forensic data analysis for attack attribution and thwarts deception, reconstructing complex 
attack patterns for enriching and sharing intelligence, as well as continuous security compliance 
monitoring. Live, network, and memory forensics are useful in detecting the footprint of insider 
threats. Live forensic is a process of analyzing digital evidence while the event is still in the process, 
which is the opposite of dead forensic. Network forensic is another area of digital forensic that deals 
with the analysis and investigation of network attacks. Memory forensic allows the analysis and 
retrieval of the data from the volatile memory that contains the current state of applications, operating 
system (OS), and application data. Digital evidence as the data (text, video, audio, and images) is 
processed and cached sometimes in a log file or transmitted with the support or disprove a theory of 
how the stealing of data occurred. 
Overall, the user-oriented and process-oriented controls with rule-based anomaly detection and 
forensic data analysis are required for monitoring insider activities in the Cloud. 
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6.2.5. Corporate Insider Threat 
A user and role-based profile with an anomaly detection system incorporating technical and 
behavioral activities are effective to be considered, which examines possible threats imposed by 
individuals [87]. Data from an activity log can be construed from the user and created into a tree-
structured profile for the users and their associated roles. This activity allows a comparison between 
the users and their roles, whilst also providing an image representation of the present behavior of 
each user. This can then be compared with other observations and peer observations. 
Traditional intrusion detection systems are not capable of identifying malicious insiders within 
an organization. In this direction, an automated system based on tree-structure profiling, which is 
capable of detecting insider threats within an organization, can be valuable [88]. Such a system 
incorporates activities details of each user and each job role and uses this data to deliver rich 
information about the user’s actual behavior. The deviation can be measured based on the volume of 
variance that each user shows across multiple attributes compared to their peers. 
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is considered a promising alternative to the traditional 
models of access control (including, role-based access control (RBAC)), where possible, in the 
corporate and industrial context. ABAC and RBAC are effective ways of controlling the 
authentication process and authorizing users and their access rights. The key difference between 
ABAC and RBAC is that ABAC provides access rights centered on the user, environment, or resource 
attributes, whereas RBAC offers access to resources based on user roles. However, ABAC brings 
several unexplored issues such as audibility, scalability, hierarchical structure representations, 
delegation, and administration. Servos et al. [89] provided a comprehensive review of recent research 
efforts toward emerging the formal model of ABAC. The organizational data have been the most 
vulnerable to attacks by insiders, especially data located in databases and corporate file servers. 
Anomaly detection is a useful technique for alerting early marks of insider attacks, current techniques 
in database access are not much effective in detecting the sophisticated data misuse events (e.g., data 
updates track and the data aggregation) by the insiders [90]. Besides, monitoring the complete data 
retrieved by each user and comparing it to a base level result in low accuracy and long detection time. 
A detection technique for data aggregation that attempts to track data updates can also be adopted. 
Such a technique infers the regular rates of table references and tuples retrievals from past database 
access logs and analyzes user queries that lead to exceeding the normal data access rates. 
Mostly unsupervised behavioral anomaly detection techniques are developed to find abnormal 
changes in user behavior over time. However, anomalous activities (temporal changes) are not 
necessarily malicious in nature. A time-series classification technique of user activities for insider 
threat detection is ideal to use as outperforms other traditional techniques based on unsupervised 
behavioral anomaly detection [91]. 
Overall, technical and behavioral activities along with data aggregation attempts to track data 
updates, and temporal changes are to be observed through activity logs and user profiles. 
6.2.6. Insider Threat in Organizational IT Systems 
The preventive measures need to be taken that assess the risks as well as reactive methods to 
combat the problem of insider threats [92]. In this direction, an identification-based framework is 
suitable for the initial requirement analysis of the organizational IT systems. Such a framework gives 
security engineers the support of detecting insider threats and presents prioritization dependent on 
the risk they pose to the organization. Within the requirement modeling language, an asset model 
and a trust model can also be considered, which permit the detection of insiders. The asset model 
associates the security properties and sensitivity levels to assets, whilst the trust model stipulates the 
trust level that a user puts into another user regarding permission on an asset. The one-class anomaly 
detection method can also be implemented, which measures classified resembles between the history 
of a user and events recorded in a time-window of the user’s session [93]. This idea is based on the 
weighted oriented graph partitioning technique for event sequences where the strongly connected 
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nodes have to belong to the same cluster. Alternatively, a system based on a neural network with 
long short-term memory (LSTM) can be embraced, which simulates a system logs as a natural 
structured sequence and captures patterns of the users’ normal usage behavior to distinguish normal 
behavior from malicious acts [94]. 
Overall, risk prioritization, security properties, and sensitivity levels to assets, identification-
based, and similarity-based detection methods are required. 
6.2.7. Combat Insider Threat in Enterprise Business 
To combat insider threat, a combination of the enterprise business processes and the human 
factor is needed that inhibits them [95]. A process monitoring model is suitable to use that merges 
observing at the runtime level. The input involves psychometric evaluations from social media 
profiles of employees. The human factor aspect is considered as well as the technical approaches to 
monitoring. As its countermeasures, Homoliak et al. [12] identified five subcategories of the defense 
solutions: (a) mitigation and prevention, (b) detection and threat assessment, (c) best practices and 
guidelines, (d) decoy-based solutions, and (e) other practical solutions. Moreover, for a real 
demonstration, real insider threat data were collected from several host-based heterogeneous data 
sources (such as mouse, keyboard, processes, and file system) through a gamified process [82]. The 
users as investors can make a deal by spending some points they have and during masquerade 
sessions at specific intervals, each group was given access to the resource (a machine in this case) that 
belonged to another group. The whole idea is to allow stealing of the list of contacted investors from 
the victim’s machine, and thus prevent other groups from winning. It demonstrates that combating 
insider threats in business through a gamified environment is quite effective. 
Many real-world applications differ in their data collection techniques and dissimilarity in 
deployment environments. It can happen that one kind of machine learning-based detection system 
may not be effective and efficient for other systems. In such cases, methods that allow a previously 
trained population of linear genetic programming (LGP), an insider threat detector is useful to adapt 
to an expanded feature space [96]. This reduces the computation requirements and accelerating 
deployment under new conditions. Moreover, technology-based analysis is divided into two parts: 
host-based and network-based. A data source is generated from the insider’s continuous interaction 
with the system (host). These interactions consist of application-level data, for example, keystrokes 
and mouse dynamics, Unix Syslog, windows event log, and operating system low-level data like data 
such as system calls. Window specific sensors can also be used to collect data from analytical system 
events such as key registry modification, system file operations, and process creation to create a 
biometric motivated solution to detect malignant insiders and deter impersonations. The network-
based analysis includes data filtering and classification using machine learning, statistical analysis, 
and rule-based analytical techniques to determine the type of threat. All the servers (such as Dynamic 
Host Configuration Protocol—DHCP server, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol—LDAP server, 
web server, proxy, and email Server) deployed in the network are responsible for generating network 
logs. 
Overall, a combination of the enterprise business processes and human factors can be used to 
detect malicious behavior. Additionally, psychometric evaluations from social media profiles of 
employees and the trained population-based threat detector are useful to consider. 
6.2.8. Insider Threat via Social Engineering 
Social engineering allows interaction between humans to extract entry information or 
unauthorized access for the system in an illegal way. Since not every staff member(s) is trained, they 
lack building confidentiality in handling such phishing campaigns. In addition to looking at the 
technical methods, an emotional way of thinking can be useful in understanding human nature to 
detect, say, the phishing email [97]. Two factors most influence human nature: personality and 
culture. Personality factors can be agreeableness, neuroticism, conscientiousness, extraversion, and 
openness to experience. The insiders do use these personality and cultural factors to target a phishing 
activity, hence, such factors can help to detect malicious or fake information. 
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A malicious insider may send or receive sensitive information as email images attachments. As 
a solution, the Email Attachments Receiver (EAR), which is a custom-built application, can be used 
to search Google Mail (Gmail) for images [98]. The application allows an analyst to comment on the 
image and investigate whether the image was previously seen, hence, decreasing false positives. 
However, a formal analysis of the images is necessary at a later stage as enhancements are needed, 
such as improvements in handling large datasets and postulating other analyst views. 
One of the most critical challenges is to pinpoint and incorporate behavioral (sociotechnical) 
indicators of insider threat risks in addition to the common cyber and technical indicators. For that, 
it is important to consider readily available data. The insider threat techniques most often fail to 
address the human side issues. Greitzer et al. [99] performed a study with experts to complete email-
based and online surveys and developed an inclusive insider threat ontology called, Sociotechnical 
and Organizational Factors for Insider Threat (SOFIT), which includes behavioral and organizational 
indicators as well as technical indicators. Their study was based on the threat ratings of single 
indicators, ratings for scenarios involving multiple indicators, temporal associations, and comparing 
fear with likelihood threat ratings. 
Overall, the internal threat sensitivity of different personality characters is unclear and cultural 
differences of employees are not sufficiently appreciated and considered in research. The 
combination of the weighted personality, abilities, training and skills, dynamic emotions and 
attitudes, sociotechnical indicators, and culture can forecast individual and organizational 
undesirable and adverse impact behaviors. 
7. Conclusions 
In summary, insider threat is still a real challenge for organizations. This work has investigated 
insider threats and their criticality for organizations to combat these threats to mitigate risk. Malicious 
insiders have become a major security issue for all enterprises as insiders can range from low-level 
employees to high ranking personnel that have knowledge and access to confidential organizational 
information. Privilege escalation, exfiltration attacks, and APTs are some of the many techniques 
utilized by malicious insiders. To execute their attack, an insider needs to complete all stages of the 
kill chain, thus improving defenses at all phases of the kill chain can help deny future attacks. 
Improving defenses can be done through the establishment of sound security policies and monitoring 
of employee activity is essential in defending against malicious insider activity. Thus, the critical 
evaluation of the insider threat serves as a tool for organizations to expand their knowledge of this 
ever-evolving threat. As previously mentioned, different forms of insider threats need to be 
addressed (detect the threat and prevent any inappropriate access of organizational resources), which 
target different subsystems of the organization, such as device level, data level, and corporate and 
business level. 
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